产业组织模式对经济林种植户生态化经营的影响

doi:10.11707/j.1001-7488.20200615

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

目的: 从产业组织嵌入的视角分析农户采取生态化经营的行为机制，使用浙江省经济林种植户的调查数据实证检验不同组织模式对经济林种植全程生态化经营水平的影响。方法: 于2018年采取典型抽样和随机抽样相结合的方法对浙江省经济林种植户进行实地调研并获取429个有效样本，采用Order-Probit模型和Probit模型作为基准模型初步分析产业组织模式对生态化经营的影响，进而采用倾向得分匹配模型(PSM)消除基准模型可能产生的样本选择性偏误。结果: PSM的处理组平均处理效应(ATT)估计结果显示：1)合作社模式使得农户生态化经营综合得分平均提高0.557 4，且结果在1%的显著性水平上通过检验，合作社模式使得农户采纳套种、人工除草、测土配方施肥、降低施药强度、青果处理、外种皮处理技术的概率分别提高14.95%、19.9%、33.66%、17.18%、26.38%、22.06%，且结果均至少在5%的显著性水平上通过检验；2)公司+农户模式(公司和农户在产销环节建立稳定的合作关系)使得农户生态化经营综合得分平均提高0.388 2，且结果在5%的显著性水平上通过检验，公司+农户模式对降低施药强度影响不显著，但使得农户采纳套种、人工除草、测土配方施肥、青果处理、外种皮处理技术的概率分别提高12.94%、9.82%、17.65%、16.18%、16.83%，且结果均至少在10%的显著性水平上通过检验；3)销售合同模式(经销商和农户建立稳定的供销关系)不能显著提升生态化经营综合得分，销售合同模式仅在10%的显著性水平上使得农户采纳外种皮处理技术的概率提高11.88%，对其他环节单项生态化技术的ATT估计结果均不显著。PSM的控制组平均处理效应(ATU)估计结果显示：1)假如未加入合作社的农户加入合作社可使得生态化经营综合得分平均提高0.550 9；2)非公司+农户组织模式的农户假如参加公司+农户可使得生态化经营综合得分平均提高0.465 6；3)非销售合同组织模式的农户假如参加销售合同组织模式可使得生态化经营综合得分平均提高0.210 6。结论: 1)经济林种植户生产全过程生态化经营水平总体偏低，相应地，对各环节单项生态化技术的采纳率偏低。2)销售合同模式对经济林种植全程生态化经营水平的促进作用不显著，合作社模式比公司+农户模式更能促进经济林种植全程生态化经营水平提升。3)未来若能进一步提高生产组织化水平，经济林种植全程生态化经营水平仍具有提升潜力，不同组织模式作用下经济林种植全程生态化经营水平提升潜力为合作社>公司+农户>销售合同。4)户主为男性、学历教育、接受技术培训能够显著促进经济林种植全程生态化经营水平提升，非农就业的增加会显著抑制经济林种植户采取全程生态化经营。

关键词: 产业组织, 生态化经营, 组织模式, 经济林, 农户

Abstract:

Objective: From the perspective of industrial organization,this paper analyzes the behavioral mechanism of ecological management adopted by farmer households and uses the survey data of economic forest growers in Zhejiang Province to empirically test the effect of different organization models on the whole process's ecological management of economic forest planting. Method: Typical sampling and random sampling were used to conduct field survey on economic forest growers in Zhejiang Province in 2018, and obtained 429 valid samples. The impact of industrial organization model on ecological management is preliminarily analyzed by using Order-Probit model and Probit model as the benchmark model,and then uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM) model to eliminate selective bias. Result: The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) estimation of PSM showed that:1) Farmers' cooperative model increases the overall score of farmers' ecological management by 0.557 4 on average,significant at the level of 1%. Farmers' cooperative model increases the probability of adopting interplanting,artificial weeding,soil testing formula fertilization,reducing the intensity of fertilization,green fruit treatment and exocarp treatment by 14.95%,19.9%,33.66%,17.18%,26.38%,and 22.06%,all significant at the level of 5% at least. 2) Company & farmer cooperative model (the companies and farmers establish a stable cooperative relationship in the production and marketing links) increases the overall score of farmer's ecological management by 0.388 2 on average,significant at the level of 5%. Company & farmer cooperative model has no significant effect on reducing the intensity of pesticide application,but it makes the probability of adopting interplanting,artificial weeding,soil testing formula fertilization,green fruit treatment,exocarp treatment technology increased by 12.94%,9.82%,17.65%,16.18% and 16.83% respectively,all significant at the level of 10% at least. 3) Market contract model (the dealers and farmers establish a stable supply and marketing relationship) can not significantly improve the overall score of ecological management. Market contract model only increases the probability of adopting exocarp treatment technology by 11.88% at a significant level of 10%. The ATT estimations for other ecological technologies are not significant. The average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) estimation of PSM showed that:1) If farmers who do not join farmers' cooperative join the farmers' cooperative,the overall score of ecological management will increase by 0.550 9 on average; 2) If farmers who do not join company & farmer cooperative join the company & farmer cooperative,the overall score of ecological management will increase by 0.465 6 on average; 3) If farmers who do not join market contract model join market contract model,the overall score of ecological management increased by 0.210 6 on average. Conclusion: 1) The level of ecological management of economic forest planting during the whole production process is generally low,correspondingly,the adoption rate of each single ecological technology is low. 2) The promotion effect of market contract organization model on ecological management of economic forest planting during the whole production process is not significant. Farmers' cooperative model has a greater effect on promoting the ecological management of economic forest planting than the company & farmer cooperative model. 3) On the situation of improving the level of production organization in the future,the ecological management during the whole process of economic forest planting still has the potential to improve. Comparing the potential of ecological management of economic forest planting under different organization models,they ranked in the following order:farmers' cooperative model > company & farmer cooperative model > market contract model. 4) Male householder,education and technical training can significantly promote the whole process of eco-management of economic forest planting,and the increase in non-agricultural employment will significantly inhibit economic forest growers to adopt the whole process of ecological management.

Key words: industrial organization, ecological management, organization model, economic forest, household

中图分类号:

F307.2

李博伟,朱臻,沈月琴. 产业组织模式对经济林种植户生态化经营的影响[J]. 林业科学, 2020, 56(6): 152-164.

Bowei Li,Zhen Zhu,Yueqin Shen. Impact of Industrial Organization Model on Ecological Management of Economic Forest Growers[J]. Scientia Silvae Sinicae, 2020, 56(6): 152-164.

图/表 6

表1

表2

表3

表4

产业组织嵌入对生态化经营综合得分(ES)影响的平均边际效应①"

变量代码 Variable code	ES=0	ES=1	ES=2	ES=3	ES=4	ES=5	ES=6
MC	-0.019 5	-0.040 8	-0.014 1	0.018 0	0.032 7	0.017 4	0.006 3
	(0.016 2)	(0.033 3)	(0.011 8)	(0.014 8)	(0.026 9)	(0.014 6)	(0.005 5)
FC	-0.037 2^**	-0.078 1^***	-0.027 0^**	0.034 5^**	0.062 5^***	0.033 2^**	0.012 1^**
	(0.015 4)	(0.029 2)	(0.011 0)	(0.013 5)	(0.024 1)	(0.013 8)	(0.006 2)
CO	-0.028 7^**	-0.060 3^**	-0.020 8^**	0.026 6^**	0.048 2^**	0.025 6^**	0.009 3^*
	(0.013 6)	(0.027 2)	(0.009 9)	(0.012 4)	(0.021 9)	(0.012 4)	(0.005 5)
AG	0.001 0	0.002 1	0.000 7	-0.000 9	-0.001 6	-0.000 9	-0.000 3
	(0.000 6)	(0.001 3)	(0.000 5)	(0.000 6)	(0.001 0)	(0.000 6)	(0.000 2)
GE	-0.058 6^***	-0.123 1^***	-0.042 5^***	0.054 3^***	0.098 5^***	0.052 3^***	0.019 1^**
	(0.019 2)	(0.035 5)	(0.014 6)	(0.016 7)	(0.029 6)	(0.017 9)	(0.008 8)
ED	-0.003 5^*	-0.007 3^**	-0.002 5^*	0.003 2^*	0.005 9^*	0.003 1^*	0.001 1
	(0.001 9)	(0.003 7)	(0.001 4)	(0.001 7)	(0.003 0)	(0.001 7)	(0.000 7)
TE	-0.013 0^***	-0.027 2^***	-0.009 4^***	0.012 0^***	0.021 8^***	0.011 6^***	0.042 1^***
	(0.003 1)	(0.010 4)	(0.002 9)	(0.004 0)	(0.008 0)	(0.003 8)	(0.012 8)
VC	-0.005 0	-0.010 4	-0.003 6	0.004 6	0.008 3	0.004 4	0.001 6
	(0.011 2)	(0.023 5)	(0.008 2)	(0.010 4)	(0.018 9)	(0.010 0)	(0.003 7)
FI	0.000 4	0.000 9	0.000 3	-0.000 4	-0.000 7	-0.000 4	-0.000 1
	(0.000 5)	(0.001 0)	(0.000 4)	(0.000 5)	(0.000 8)	(0.000 4)	(0.000 2)
FL	0.007 0	0.014 7	0.005 1	-0.006 5	-0.011 7	-0.006 2	-0.002 3
	(0.007 5)	(0.015 5)	(0.005 4)	(0.006 9)	(0.012 4)	(0.006 7)	(0.002 5)
PA	-0.000 7	-0.001 5	-0.000 5	0.000 7	0.001 2	0.000 6	0.000 2
	(0.001 7)	(0.003 5)	(0.001 2)	(0.001 5)	(0.002 8)	(0.001 5)	(0.000 5)
NA	0.054 7^**	0.114 9^**	0.039 7^**	-0.050 7^**	-0.092 0^**	-0.048 8^**	-0.017 8
	(0.024 7)	(0.050 7)	(0.018 6)	(0.023 6)	(0.044 6)	(0.023 1)	(0.048 0)
树种 Tree species	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled
Log likelihood	-704.577 7
LR Chi²	34.40
Prob>Chi²	0.000 6
N	429

表4

表5

产业组织嵌入对农户采纳单项生态化技术的影响的平均边际效应"

变量代码 Variable code	IP	AW	ST	RP	GT	ET
MC	0.123 8^*	0.026 1	0.019 1	0.028 5	0.011 7	0.136 4^**
	(0.072 6)	(0.058 5)	(0.051 6)	(0.055 6)	(0.056 2)	(0.056 1)
FC	0.169 9^**	0.177 1^***	0.298 5^***	0.106 5^*	0.181 2^***	0.196 5^***
	(0.062 8)	(0.060 7)	(0.045 1)	(0.056 6)	(0.060 5)	(0.052 4)
CO	0.147 4^***	0.173 9^**	0.246 7^***	0.052 1	0.170 1^**	0.164 7^**
	(0.059 0)	(0.069 8)	(0.052 3)	(0.065 2)	(0.069 1)	(0.064 0)
AG	-0.002 8	0.004 0	0.001 0	-0.006 3^**	-0.001 5	-0.002 4
	(0.002 8)	(0.002 8)	(0.002 2)	(0.002 6)	(0.002 7)	(0.002 6)
GE	0.146 5^*	0.105 7	0.007 8	0.230 0^***	0.118 4	0.112 2
	(0.078 6)	(0.075 3)	(0.061 8)	(0.081 3)	(0.076 4)	(0.070 6)
ED	0.014 1^*	0.001 1	0.000 1	0.007 3	0.011 5	0.019 6^***
	(0.008 2)	(0.008 0)	(0.006 4)	(0.007 4)	(0.007 9)	(0.007 4)
TE	0.087 8^*	0.012 6	0.149 7^***	0.129 3^***	0.094 1^**	0.012 5
	(0.048 2)	(0.048 5)	(0.037 6)	(0.044 4)	(0.046 8)	(0.045 6)
VC	-0.030 0	0.007 0	0.043 1	0.013 4^*	0.135 0^***	-0.005 2
	(0.051 2)	(0.051 7)	(0.038 9)	(0.007 1)	(0.049 5)	(0.048 3)
FI	0.000 2	-0.005 2^**	0.003 7^**	-0.002 5	-0.003 7^*	-0.006 2^***
	(0.002 2)	(0.002 2)	(0.001 7)	(0.002 0)	(0.002 2)	(0.002 4)
FL	-0.037 0	0.032 6	-0.024 7	-0.042 0	-0.053 6	-0.022 1
	(0.034 1)	(0.033 4)	(0.026 6)	(0.031 7)	(0.033 0)	(0.031 6)
PA	0.003 2	-0.000 5	0.005 0	0.060 9	-0.008 7	-0.006 4
	(0.007 6)	(0.008 6)	(0.004 9)	(0.048 5)	(0.007 0)	(0.007 6)
NA	-0.073 7	-0.321 8^***	-0.008 5	-0.231 3^***	-0.305 5^***	-0.231 4^***
	(0.068 0)	(0.062 4)	(0.053 2)	(0.061 1)	(0.060 7)	(0.059 5)
树种 Tree species	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled	已控制 Controlled
Log likelihood	-274.521 0	-270.399 1	-181.643 2	-246.153 1	-264.664 4	-244.197 6
LR Chi²	27.08	52.89	82.70	63.02	64.16	97.62
Prob>Chi²	0.007 5	0.000 0	0.000 0	0.000 0	0.000 0	0.000 0
N	429	429	429	429	429	429

表5

表6

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树种分布 Tree species distribution	毛竹 Phyllostachys edulis	榧树 Torreya grandis	山核桃 Carya cathayensis	油茶 Camellia oleifera	板栗 Castanea mollissima	雷竹 Phyllostachys praecox ‘Prevernalis’	合计 Total
样本县 Sample counties	安吉、龙游、遂昌Anji, Longyou, Suichang	诸暨、嵊州、松阳Zhuji, Shengzhou, Songyang	临安、淳安、建德Lin’an, Chun’an, Jiande	常山、青田 Changshan, Qingtian	桐庐、云和 Tonglu, Yunhe	临安 Lin’an	13
样本数Sample size	120	120	88	40	40	21	429

变量 Variable	代码 Code	定义 Definition	均值 Mean	标准差 SD	最大值 Max.	最小值 Min.
套种Interplanting	IP	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.40	0.49	1	0
人工除草Artificial weeding	AW	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.48	0.50	1	0
测土配方施肥Soil testing and formula fertilization	ST	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.21	0.41	1	0
降低施药强度 Reducing the intensity of pesticide application	RP	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.35	0.48	1	0
青果处理Green fruit treatment	GT	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.47	0.50	1	0
外种皮处理Exocarp treatment	ET	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.57	0.50	1	0
生态化经营得分Ecological management score	ES	技术采纳综合得分Comprehensive score of technology adoption	2.48	1.33	6	0
销售合同Market contract	MC	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.38	0.49	1	0
合作社Farmer cooperative	FC	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.23	0.42	1	0
公司+农户Company-farmer cooperative	CO	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.16	0.37	1	0
户主年龄Householder age	AG	—	56.39	9.60	84	24
性别Gender	GE	0=女；1=男 0=Female, 1=Male	0.89	0.31	1	0
受教育年限Education years	ED	自小学开始的受教育年限 Education years since primary school	7.21	3.31	16	0
技术培训Technical training	TE	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.48	0.50	1	0
村干部Village cadres	VC	0=否；1=是0=No, 1=Yes	0.34	0.48	1	0
家庭收入Family income/10⁴yuan	FI	2017年家庭收入Family income 2017	10.51	11.17	100	0.15
家庭林业劳动力Family forestry labor	FL	家庭从事林业劳动力人数Number of family workers engaged in forestry	1.73	0.69	5	1
种植面积Planting area/hm²	PA	—	1.91	3.15	42.67	0.07
非农收入比重Proportion of non-agricultural income	NA	非农收入与家庭总收入之比 Ratio of non-agricultural income to total household income	0.63	0.36	1	0
样本数Number of samples	N	—	429	429	429	429

生态化经营行为 Ecological management behavior	独立经营的农户 Independent farmer	与经销商签订销售合同的农户 Farmer signing sales contract with distributor	加入合作社的农户 Farmer joining cooperatives	与公司合作的农户 Farmer cooperating with company	总体 Total
套种Interplanting(%)	29.59	44.17	41	41.18	39.63
人工除草Artificial weeding(%)	37.76	39.88	61	60.29	47.55
测土配方施肥 Soil testing and formula fertilization(%)	7.14	11.66	41	36.76	21.45
降低施药强度 Reducing the intensity of pesticide application(%)	36.73	26.38	44	39.71	34.97
青果处理Green fruit treatment(%)	30.61	55.83	58	35.29	47.32
外种皮处理Exocarp treatment(%)	33.67	78.53	60	35.29	57.11
综合得分均值 Ecological management score(mean)	1.76	2.56	3.05	2.49	2.48
样本数Number of samples	98	163	100	68	429

变量代码 Variable code	效应 Effect	ES	IP	AW	ST	RP	GT	ET
MC	ATT	0.085 9	0.092 0	0.088 2	0.059 4	0.085 9	0.085 9	0.118 8^*
	ATU	0.210 6	0.007 5	0.017 4	0.125 2	-0.007 5	0.079 0	0.039 9
	ATE	0.163 2	0.039 6	0.044 3	0.100 2	0.028 0	0.081 6	0.069 9
FC	ATT	0.557 4^***	0.149 5^**	0.199 0^***	0.336 6^***	0.171 8^***	0.263 8^***	0.220 6^***
	ATU	0.550 9	0.194 6	0.231 3	0.320 2	0.175 7	0.099 1	0.322 0
	ATE	0.552 4^***	0.184 1^***	0.223 8^***	0.324 0^***	0.174 8^**	0.137 5^**	0.298 4^***
CO	ATT	0.388 2^**	0.129 4^*	0.098 2^*	0.176 5^**	0.058 8	0.161 8^**	0.168 3^***
	ATU	0.465 6	0.162 2	0.158 8	0.066 5	0.080 3	0.119 1	0.250 9
	ATE	0.453 3^**	0.157 0^*	0.149 2^**	0.083 9	0.076 9	0.125 9^**	0.237 8^***
N		429	429	429	429	429	429	429

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