基于三方演化博弈的森林横向生态补偿策略及其稳定性——以重庆市为例

doi:10.11707/j.1001-7488.LYKX20230342

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

目的: 横向生态补偿是引导多元主体参与区域生态环境治理的重要举措，探究森林横向生态补偿过程中的政府主体行为选择，以促进森林生态保护、协调地区公平发展。方法: 构建森林生态保护地区、森林生态受益地区和中央政府三方演化博弈模型，探索森林横向生态补偿不同发展阶段的三方主体决策和演化路径，结合重庆市2020年实际数据仿真分析重庆市森林横向生态补偿机制建设进展及主要参数变化对博弈系统的影响。结果: 在森林横向生态补偿不同发展阶段，博弈主体会达到不同的稳定均衡点，初期地方政府之间无法自发达成合作，需要中央政府监管，待森林横向生态补偿机制成熟后，即使中央政府不实施监管，地方政府之间也能实现合作；重庆市当前处于森林横向生态补偿发展阶段前期，三方博弈主体最优策略集合为“保护”、“补偿”、“监管”；森林生态保护地区与受益地区基层政府对上级（重庆市）政府奖励和惩罚的敏感性存在差异，森林生态受益地区基层政府对奖励金额的敏感性更高；补偿金额大小会影响地方政府达到稳定状态的时间和决策选择，公众媒体参与程度高低与博弈三方主体达到稳定均衡状态的速度呈正比。结论: 森林横向生态补偿发展过程存在阶段性特征，重庆市当前处于发展阶段前期，上级政府的奖惩金额、补偿金额和公众媒体的参与程度会对三方博弈主体策略选择产生重要影响。基于此，从上级政府、森林生态保护地区和森林生态受益地区基层政府等角度提出相关建议：1）上级政府应主导建立森林横向生态补偿协商机制，推动协议达成，并通过完善监管制度、制定差异化奖惩机制、动态调整奖惩力度，确保补偿成效与资金效率；2）森林生态保护地区政府应依托本地资源，发展林业生态产业，拓展林下经济、康养旅游和文创贸易等新业态，提升综合收益；3）森林生态受益地区应基于经济发展水平，核算保护地区的生态成本与服务价值，结合林种质量与生态区位，制定科学的补偿标准；4）倡导公众媒体积极参与森林生态补偿进程，引导社会形成共同监督的氛围。

关键词: 横向生态补偿, 森林, 利益相关者, 演化博弈, 公众媒体, 重庆市

Abstract:

Objective: Horizontal ecological compensation is an important initiative to guide multiple subjects to participate in regional ecological environment governance. It is important to study the choice of governmental subject behavior in the process of forest horizontal compensation to promote forest ecological protection and coordinate equitable regional development. Method: This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving forest ecological protection areas, beneficial areas, and the central government. It explores the decision-making and evolutionary paths of the three parties at different stages. Based on the actual data of Chongqing in 2020, this paper conducts a simulation analysis to examine the progress of Chongqing’s forest horizontal ecological compensation mechanism and the impact of changes in key parameters on the game system. Result: The results show that the players of the game will reach different stable equilibrium points in different development stages. In the initial period, the cooperation between local governments cannot be reached spontaneously, which requires the supervision of the central government. When the forest horizontal ecological compensation enters the mature period, the cooperation between local governments can still be achieved without the supervision of the central government. Chongqing is currently in the early stage of the developmental period, and the optimal strategy of the tripartite game players is“protection, compensation and supervision”. The grassroots governments in forest ecological protection areas and beneficial areas have different sensitivity to the rewards and punishments of the the superior government (Chongqing), and the grassroots governments in forest ecological beneficial areas have higher sensitivity to the reward amount. The amount of compensation fees can affect the time and decision making of the local government to reach the stable state. The degree of public media participation is directly proportional to the speed at which the three parties of the game reach a stable equilibrium state. Conclusion: There are stage characteristics in the development process of forest horizontal ecological compensation. Chongqing is currently in the early stage of development, and the amount of reward and punishment of the higher government, compensation amount and the participation degree of the public media will affect the strategy selection of the main body of the tripartite game. Based on this, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of the superior government, the grass-roots government of the forest ecological protection areas, and the grassroots government of the forest ecological beneficial areas, respectively: 1) The superior government should lead the establishment of a consultation mechanism for forest horizontal ecological compensation, promote the conclusion of the agreement, and dynamically adjust the reward and punishment intensity by improving the supervision system and formulating differentiated reward and punishment mechanisms to ensure the compensation effectiveness and financial efficiency. 2) The government of forest ecological protection areas should leverage local resources to develop ecological forestry industries, expand new business models such as under-forest economy, health and wellness tourism, and cultural and creative trade, thereby enhancing comprehensive benefits. 3) Based on the level of economic development, the ecological cost and service value of the forest ecological beneficial areas should be calculated, and the quality of forest species and ecological location should be combined to formulate scientific compensation standards. 4) It is advocated that the public and media actively participate in the process of forest ecological compensation, guiding society to foster a collective atmosphere of supervision.

Key words: horizontal ecological compensation, forest, stakeholders, evolutionary game, public media, Chongqing City

中图分类号:

S7-9
F307.2

余红红,杨加猛. 基于三方演化博弈的森林横向生态补偿策略及其稳定性——以重庆市为例[J]. 林业科学, 2025, 61(3): 214-232.

Honghong Yu,Jiameng Yang. Forest Horizontal Ecological Compensation Strategy and Its Stability Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game: a Case of Chongqing City[J]. Scientia Silvae Sinicae, 2025, 61(3): 214-232.

图/表 16

表1

参数说明"

参数Parameter	含义Description
C₁	森林生态保护地区保护森林付出的直接成本与放弃发展其他产业的机会成本The direct costs of forest conservation in protected forest areas and the opportunity costs of forgoing the development of other industries
C₂	上级政府监督地方政府行为付出的监管成本，由固定成本与可变成本2部分组成The supervision cost paid by the superior government to supervise the behaviors of local governments consists of two parts: fixed cost and variable cost
F	森林生态受益地区支付给森林生态保护地区的生态补偿费用The ecological compensation fees paid by forest ecological beneficial areas to forest ecological conservation areas
R₁	森林生态保护地区选择“保护”策略即改善生态环境给当地区域带来的经济收益（如木材、财政纵向转移支付等）The “protection” strategy of forest ecological protection area means the economic benefits (such as timber, financial vertical transfer payment, etc.) brought by improving the ecological environment to the local area
R₂	森林生态保护地区选择“不保护”策略时获得的经济收益The economic benefits obtained when the forest ecological protection area chooses “not protection” strategy
E₁	森林保护地区因保护森林资源、改善当地环境带来的生态收益The ecological benefits brought by protecting forest resources and improving local environment in forest protected areas
E₂	森林保护地区保护森林资源外溢的森林生态效益The spillover forest ecological benefits generated by forest conservation areas through the protection of forest resources
E	森林保护地区保护森林给上级政府带来的环境收益The environmental benefits that forest protection areas bring to higher levels of government through forest protection
C_s、C_x	横向生态补偿交易成本，森林生态保护地区与生态受益地区为签订补偿合同付出的成本The transaction costs of horizontal ecological compensation, which refer to the costs incurred by forest ecological conservation areas and ecological beneficial areas in negotiating and signing compensation agreements
P₁、P₂	地方政府违反合同中央政府的罚款The fine imposed by the central government on local governments for violating the contract
A₁、A₂	中央政府对地方政府履行合同的奖励The rewards from the central government to local governments for fulfilling contracts
H	上级政府监管后，环境改善给上级政府带来的社会收益（声誉、公信力等的提升）The social benefits (such as enhanced reputation, credibility, etc.) brought to the higher levels of government through environmental improvements following its regulatory efforts
L	环境恶劣给中央政府名誉带来的负面影响The negative impact on the central government’s reputation caused by environmental degradation
$ \beta $	公众媒体监督参与程度The public media supervision participation degree
H₁	森林生态保护地区采取“保护”策略，媒体报道对森林生态保护地区产生的社会收益The social benefits generated by media coverage for forest ecological protection areas when they adopt the “protection” strategy
H₂	森林生态受益地区采取“补偿”策略，媒体报道对森林生态受益地区产生的社会收益The social benefits generated by media coverage for forest ecological beneficial areas when they adopt the “paying for compensation fee” strategy
L₁	森林生态保护地区采取“不保护”策略，媒体报道造成森林生态保护地区政府的负面影响The negative impacts generated by media coverage for forest ecological protection areas when they adopt the “not protection” strategy
L₂	森林生态受益地区采取“不补偿”策略，媒体报道造成森林生态受益地区政府的负面影响The negative impacts caused by media coverage for forest ecological beneficial areas when they adopt the “not paying for-compensation fee” strategy

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森林生态保护地区政府 Forest ecological protection area government	森林生态受益地区政府 Forest ecological beneficial area government	中央政府Central government
森林生态保护地区政府 Forest ecological protection area government	森林生态受益地区政府 Forest ecological beneficial area government	监管Supervise(z)	不监管Unregulated(1?z)
保护Protection(x)	补偿Paying for compensation fee(y)	F+R₁+E₁+$ \beta {H}_{1} $+A₁?C₁?C_s，E₂+A₂?F?C_x+$ \beta {H}_{2} $， H+E?C₂?A₁?A₂	F+R₁+E₁?C₁?C_s+$ \beta {H}_{1} $， E₂?F?C_x+$ \beta {H}_{2} $，E
保护Protection(x)	不补偿Not paying for compensation fee(1?y)	R₁+E₁+A₁?C₁?C_s+$ \beta {H}_{1} $，E₂?P₂?$ \beta {L}_{2} $，H+P₂+E?C₂?A₁	R₁+E₁?C₁?C_s+$ \beta {H}_{1} $，E₂?$ \beta {L}_{2} $，E
不保护No protection(1?x)	补偿Paying for compensation fee(y)	R₂+F?P₁?$ \beta {L}_{1} $，A₂?F?C_x+$ \beta {H}_{2} $，P₁?C₂?L?A₂	F+R₂?$ \beta {L}_{1} $，?F?C_x+$ \beta {H}_{2} $，?L
不保护No protection(1?x)	不补偿Not paying for compensation fee(1?y)	R₂?P₁?$ \beta {L}_{1} $，?P₂?$ \beta {L}_{2} $，P₁+P₂?C₂?L	R₂?$ \beta {L}_{1} $，?$ \beta {L}_{2} $，?L

区县 Districts and counties	木材收益 Timber income	森林生态效益补偿收益 Forest ecological benefit compensation income	林业产业产值 Forestry output value	造林成本 Afforestation cost	管护成本 Custodial cost	机会成本 Opportunity cost
万州区Wanzhou district	1 855.70	4 438.79	79 834	7 000.00	3 500.00	76 472.87
黔江区Qianjiang district	1 638.84	3 920.06	31 120	2 700.00	1 350.00	29 496.68
江津区Jiangjin district	1 672.52	4 000.62	42 688	5 116.62	2 558.31	55 897.52
永川区Yongchuan district	806.46	1 929.02	40 269	159.90	79.95	1 746.86
南川区Nanchuan district	1 441.12	3 447.13	54 484	859.80	429.90	9 393.05
大足区Dazu district	678.62	1 623.25	55 072	2 120.00	1 060.00	23 160.37
开州区Kaizhou district	2 186.96	5 231.16	52 325	1 426.68	713.34	15 586.05
梁平区Liangping district	897.92	2 147.80	33 274	743.56	371.78	8 123.12
武隆区Wulong district	1 891.97	4 525.56	22 429	435.15	217.58	4 753.88
城口县Chengkou county	2 392.59	5 723.01	18 919	2 269.47	1 134.74	24 793.28
丰都县Fengdu county	1 498.74	3 584.94	68 805	2 580.00	1 290.00	28 185.72
垫江县Dianjiang county	700.62	1 675.87	22 222	728.64	364.32	7 960.17
忠县Zhongxian County	1 152.03	2 755.62	30 143	984.15	492.08	10 751.54
云阳县Yunyang county	2 115.95	5 061.31	52 085	1 090.80	545.40	11 916.66
奉节县Fengjie county	2 561.21	6 126.35	19 367	6 160.00	3 080.00	67 296.12
巫山县Wushan county	1 840.11	4 401.50	69 571	3 540.00	1 770.00	38 673.43
巫溪县Wuxi county	2 818.33	6 741.38	44 816	5 280.00	2 640.00	57 682.40
石柱县Shizhu county	1 816.92	4 346.03	18 633	10 180.00	5 090.00	111 213.40
秀山县Xiushan county	1 358.64	3 249.84	28 333	1 994.22	997.11	21 786.25
酉阳县Youyang county	3 274.59	7 832.75	63 822	8 360.00	4 180.00	91 330.48
彭水县Pengshui county	2 353.57	5 629.69	38 237	1 405.08	702.54	15 350.07
合计Total	36 953.41	88 391.68	886 448	65 134.07	32 567.05	711 569.92

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