Abstract:

Objective: Horizontal ecological compensation is an important initiative to guide multiple subjects to participate in regional ecological environment governance. It is important to study the choice of governmental subject behavior in the process of forest horizontal compensation to promote forest ecological protection and coordinate equitable regional development. Method: This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving forest ecological protection areas, beneficial areas, and the central government. It explores the decision-making and evolutionary paths of the three parties at different stages. Based on the actual data of Chongqing in 2020, this paper conducts a simulation analysis to examine the progress of Chongqing’s forest horizontal ecological compensation mechanism and the impact of changes in key parameters on the game system. Result: The results show that the players of the game will reach different stable equilibrium points in different development stages. In the initial period, the cooperation between local governments cannot be reached spontaneously, which requires the supervision of the central government. When the forest horizontal ecological compensation enters the mature period, the cooperation between local governments can still be achieved without the supervision of the central government. Chongqing is currently in the early stage of the developmental period, and the optimal strategy of the tripartite game players is“protection, compensation and supervision”. The grassroots governments in forest ecological protection areas and beneficial areas have different sensitivity to the rewards and punishments of the the superior government (Chongqing), and the grassroots governments in forest ecological beneficial areas have higher sensitivity to the reward amount. The amount of compensation fees can affect the time and decision making of the local government to reach the stable state. The degree of public media participation is directly proportional to the speed at which the three parties of the game reach a stable equilibrium state. Conclusion: There are stage characteristics in the development process of forest horizontal ecological compensation. Chongqing is currently in the early stage of development, and the amount of reward and punishment of the higher government, compensation amount and the participation degree of the public media will affect the strategy selection of the main body of the tripartite game. Based on this, this paper puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of the superior government, the grass-roots government of the forest ecological protection areas, and the grassroots government of the forest ecological beneficial areas, respectively: 1) The superior government should lead the establishment of a consultation mechanism for forest horizontal ecological compensation, promote the conclusion of the agreement, and dynamically adjust the reward and punishment intensity by improving the supervision system and formulating differentiated reward and punishment mechanisms to ensure the compensation effectiveness and financial efficiency. 2) The government of forest ecological protection areas should leverage local resources to develop ecological forestry industries, expand new business models such as under-forest economy, health and wellness tourism, and cultural and creative trade, thereby enhancing comprehensive benefits. 3) Based on the level of economic development, the ecological cost and service value of the forest ecological beneficial areas should be calculated, and the quality of forest species and ecological location should be combined to formulate scientific compensation standards. 4) It is advocated that the public and media actively participate in the process of forest ecological compensation, guiding society to foster a collective atmosphere of supervision.

Key words: horizontal ecological compensation, forest, stakeholders, evolutionary game, public media, Chongqing City