基于演化博弈的林业碳汇项目建设违约风险防范机制

doi:10.11707/j.1001-7488.LYKX20260032

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

目的: 揭示林业碳汇项目参与主体的演化博弈规律，识别影响决策的关键参数，通过比较不同政策的边际效用探索最优政策组合，为化解林业碳汇项目违约风险提供理论依据和对策参考。方法: 构建涵盖企业、林农、核查机构和政府的四方演化博弈模型，分析项目开发不同阶段各参与主体的行为决策及其演化路径。在此基础上，结合已公示的林业碳汇项目数据和典型案例，利用MATLAB 2021a软件进行数值仿真。结果: 在项目开发不同阶段，博弈系统收敛于不同的稳定均衡。起步阶段，企业可能出于风险规避或投机目的，采取“圈地外包”的违约行为，同时，林农也可能因缺乏技术指导等选择提前采伐碳汇林。发展阶段，核查机构可能由于成本限制，仅审核申报资料的完整性。成熟阶段，随着碳汇方法学的逐步完善和监管体系的持续健全，企业和林农最终将趋向长期自觉合作，从而保障林业碳汇项目减排量的真实性和持续性。模型仿真结果表明：1）收益分配不合理是各方违约的主要诱因，通过政策干预缓解企业与林农之间的信息不对称能够显著促进履约行为；2）相比提高罚款金额，适当提升违约金额度对企业守约的促进作用更为明显，同时政府补贴能够有效提高核查机构的审核质量；3）政府补贴等激励性政策可有效避免因监管缺位导致的项目质量下降。结论: 应完善全国自愿减排交易信息平台建设，缓解信息不对称；建立以“违约?赔偿”的市场化机制为主、政府奖惩为辅的监管机制；加强政府引导，持续推进碳汇方法学研究和规范制定。

关键词: 林业碳汇, 风险防范, 演化博弈, 数值仿真

Abstract:

Objective: This study aims to reveal the evolutionary game dynamics of participants in forestry carbon sequestration projects, identify the key parameters influencing their decision-making, and explore optimal policy combinations by comparing the marginal effects of different policy measures, thereby providing a theoretical basis and policy references for mitigating default risks in forestry carbon sequestration projects. Method: A four-party evolutionary game model involving enterprises, forest landowners, verification institutions, and the government was constructed to analyze the behavioral decisions and evolutionary paths of the participants at different stages of project development. Based on this model, published data on forestry carbon sequestration projects were incorporated with typical cases, and MATLAB R2021a was used to conduct numerical simulations. Result: The game system converges to different stable equilibria at different stages of project development. In the initial stage, enterprises may engage in the default behavior of land hoarding and subcontracting due to risk aversion or speculative motives, while forest landowners may choose to prematurely harvest carbon sink forests because of insufficient technical guidance and other factors. In the development stage, verification institutions may only review the completeness of submitted applications due to cost constraints. In the mature stage, with the gradual improvement of carbon sequestration methodology and the continuous strengthening of the regulatory system, enterprises and forest landowners would ultimately tend toward long-term voluntary cooperation, thereby ensuring the authenticity and sustainability of emission reductions from forestry carbon sequestration projects. Simulation results indicate that: 1) inequitable income distribution is a major driver for default by the participants, and policy interventions that alleviate information asymmetry between enterprises and forest landowners can significantly promote compliance; 2) compared with increasing the amount of fines, appropriately increasing the amount of default compensation is more effective in promoting enterprise compliance, while government subsidies can effectively improve the quality of verification by verification institutions; and 3) incentive policies such as government subsidies can effectively prevent project quality degradation resulting from lax government supervision. Conclusion: The national voluntary emission reduction trading information platform should be improved to alleviate information asymmetry. A market-oriented regulatory mechanism centered on “default-compensation” and supplemented by government rewards and penalties should be established, and government guidance should be strengthened to continuously advance research on carbon sequestration methodologies and the formulation of relevant standards. These measures can help mitigate default risks in forestry carbon sequestration projects and promote the sustainable development of the forestry carbon sequestration market.

Key words: forestry carbon sink, risk prevention, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

中图分类号:

S7-9
F307.2

高康,郭子羽,赵旭. 基于演化博弈的林业碳汇项目建设违约风险防范机制[J]. 林业科学, 2026, 62(10): 208-220.

Kang Gao,Ziyu Guo,Xu Zhao. Mechanism for Preventing Default Risk in Forestry Carbon Sequestration Project Construction Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Scientia Silvae Sinicae, 2026, 62(10): 208-220.

图/表 11

表1

参数描述"

参数Parameter	参数含义 Description	参数Parameter	参数含义 Description
R_a	林业碳汇项目开发总收益 Total revenue from forest carbon sink project	$ F_2 $	政府对核查机构的罚款 Government fines auditing agencies for lax verification
$ \gamma_1 $	企业获得的收益分配比例 Profit distribution ratio for enterprises	$ M_0 $	政府对核查机构的补贴 Government incentives auditing agencies for rigorous verification
C_a	项目开发成本 Project development costs	R_g	项目开发后政府的碳减排收益 Government carbon emission reduction benefits following project development
C_b	项目申报成本 Project application costs	C_g	政府监管成本 Government regulatory costs
$ \gamma_2 $	企业负担的项目开发成本比例 Proportion of project development costs borne by enterprises	T_g	上级主管部门行政处罚额度 Administrative penalty amount imposed by higher-level competent authorities
R_w	企业违约圈地获得的合同转卖收入 Contract resale proceeds obtained by the enterprise through default	R_e	林农自愿认购碳汇的生态补偿量 The amount of ecological compensation voluntarily subscribed by forest landowners for carbon sinks
C_m	企业圈地支付给林农的违约金 Penalty fees paid by enterprises to forest landowners	$ \theta_1 $	企业违约对减排效果的影响系数 Coefficient of the impact of enterprise default on emissions reduction effectiveness
C_n	林农违约支付给企业的违约金 Penalty fees paid by forest landowners to enterprises	$ \theta_2 $	林农违约对减排效果的影响系数 Coefficient of the impact of forest landowners’ breach of contract on emissions reduction effectiveness
$ R_{\text{b}} $	林农违约行为造成的项目价值损失 Project value loss caused by forest landowners’ breach of contract	$ \theta_3 $	企业?林农共同违约的影响系数 Coefficient of the impact of joint breach of contract by enterprises and forest landowners
$ \beta $	林农额外木材收益的转化比例 Conversion ratio of forest landowners’ additional timber income	$ x $	企业守约开发的概率 Probability of enterprises contract compliance
R₀	核查机构的审核收益 Revenue of auditing agencies	$ y $	林农守约开发的概率 Probability of forest landowners contract compliance
$ C_1 $	核查机构全面审核成本 The cost of rigorous verification by auditing agencies	$ z $	核查机构全面审核的概率 Probability of rigorous verification by auditing agencies
$ C_2 $	核查机构准入审核成本 The cost of lax verification by auditing agencies	$ w $	政府严格监管的概率 Probability of government involvement in regulation
$ F_1 $	政府对圈地企业的罚款 Government fines for land-grabbing enterprises

表1

表2

四方主体支付矩阵"

主体策略选择 Strategy selection	企业收益 Enterprise revenue	林农收益 Forest landowners revenue	机构收益 Agency revenue	政府收益 Government revenue
（1，1，1，1）	$ \gamma_1R_{\text{a}}-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)R_{\text{a}}-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}} $	$ R_0-C_1+M_0 $	$ R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}-M_0 $
（1，1，0，1）	$ \gamma_1R_{\text{a}}-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)R_{\text{a}}-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}} $
（1，1，1，0）	$ \gamma_1R_{\text{a}}-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)R_{\text{a}}-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（1，1，0，0）	$ \gamma_1R_{\text{a}}-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)R_{\text{a}}-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（1，0，1，1）	$ \gamma_1(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}}+C_{\text{n}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}}+\beta R_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{n}} $	$ R_0-C_1+M_0 $	$ \theta_2R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}-M_0+R_{\text{e}} $
（1，0，0，1）	$ \gamma_1(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}}+C_{\text{n}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}}+\beta R_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{n}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ \theta_2R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}+R_{\text{e}} $
（1，0，1，0）	$ \gamma_1(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}}+\beta R_{\text{b}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ \theta_2R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（1，0，0，0）	$ \gamma_1(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-\gamma_2C_{\text{a}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ (1-\gamma_1)(R_{\text{a}}-R_{\text{b}})-(1-\gamma_2)C_{\text{a}}+\beta R_{\text{b}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ \theta_2R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（0，1，1，1）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}}-F_1 $	$ C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ \theta_1R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}+F_1 $
（0，1，0，1）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}}-F_1 $	$ C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_2-F_2 $	$ \theta_1R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+F_2 $
（0，1，1，0）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}} $	$ C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ \theta_1R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（0，1，0，0）	$ R_{\text{w}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ -C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ \theta_1R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（0，0，1，1）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}}+C_{\text{n}}-F_1 $	$ \beta R_{\text{b}}+C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{n}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ \theta_3R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+R_{\text{e}} $
（0，0，0，1）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}}+C_{\text{n}}-F_1 $	$ \beta R_{\text{b}}+C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{n}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_2-F_2 $	$ \theta_3R_{\text{g}}-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+F_2+R_{\text{e}} $
（0，0，1，0）	$ -C_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{m}} $	$ \beta R_{\text{b}}+C_{\text{m}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_1 $	$ \theta_3R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $
（0，0，0，0）	$ R_{\text{w}}-C_{\text{b}} $	$ \beta R_{\text{b}}-C_{\text{v}} $	$ R_0-C_2 $	$ \theta_3R_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $

表2

表3

四方纯策略均衡解的稳定性分析①"

均衡点 Equilibrium points	特征值$ \lambda_ 1、\lambda_ 2、\lambda _3、\lambda _4 $ Eigenvalues $ \lambda_ 1，\lambda _2，\lambda _3，\lambda _4 $	正负性 Positive or negative	稳定性及条件 Stability and conditions	理想性 Idealism
$ E_1(0,0,0,0) $	$ -R_{\text{w}}+\Delta _1,-\beta R_{\text{b}},-\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+F_2+R_{\text{e}}+T_{\text{g}} $	$ \times --\times $	ESS（条件1） ESS (condition 1)	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_2(0,0,0,1) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+F_1+\Delta _1,C_{\text{n}}-\beta R_{\text{b}},-\Delta P+F_2,C_{\text{g}}-F_1-F_2-R_{\text{e}}-T_{\text{g}} $	$ +\times \times \times $	不稳定 Unstable	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_3(0,0,1,0) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+\Delta _1,-\beta R_{\text{b}},\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+R_{\text{e}}+T_{\text{g}} $	$ +-+\times $	不稳定 Unstable	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_4(0,0,1,1) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+F_1+\Delta _1,C_{\text{n}}-\beta R_{\text{b}},\Delta P-F_2,C_{\text{g}}-F_1-R_{\text{e}}-T_{\text{g}} $	$ +\times \times \times $	不稳定 Unstable	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_5(0,1,0,0) $	$ -R_{\text{w}}+\Delta _2,\beta R_{\text{b}},-\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+F_2+T_{\text{g}} $	$ \times +-\times $	不稳定 Unstable	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_6(1,0,0,0) $	$ R_{\text{w}}-\Delta _1,-\Delta _3,-\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+R_{\text{e}}+T_{\text{g}} $	$ \times --\times $	ESS（条件2） ESS (condition 2)	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_7(1,0,0,1) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-F_1-\Delta _1,C_{\text{n}}-\Delta _3,-\Delta P+M_0,C_{\text{g}}-R_{\text{e}}-T_{\text{g}} $	$ -\times \times \times $	ESS（条件3） ESS (condition 3)	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_8(0,1,0,1) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+F_1+\Delta _2,-C_{\text{n}}+\beta R_{\text{b}},-\Delta P+F_2,C_{\text{g}}-F_1-F_2-T_{\text{g}} $	$ +\times \times \times $	不稳定 Unstable	不理想 Not ideal
$ E_9(0,1,1,0) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+\Delta _2,\beta R_{\text{b}},\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+F_1+T_{\text{g}} $	$ +++\times $	不稳定 Unstable	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{10}(1,0,1,0) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-\Delta _1,-\Delta _3,\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}-M_0+R_{\text{e}}+T_{\text{g}} $	$ --+\times $	不稳定 Unstable	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{11}(0,1,1,1) $	$ C_{\text{m}}+F_1+\Delta _2,-C_{\text{n}}+\beta R_{\text{b}},\Delta P-F_2,C_{\text{g}}-F_1-T_{\text{g}} $	$ +\times \times \times $	不稳定 Unstable	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{12}(1,0,1,1) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-F_1-\Delta _1,C_{\text{n}}-\Delta _3,\Delta P-M_0,C_{\text{g}}+M_0-R_{\text{e}}-T_{\text{g}} $	$ -\times \times \times $	ESS（条件4） ESS (condition 4)	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{13}(1,1,0,1) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-F_1-\Delta _2,-C_{\text{n}}+\Delta _3,-\Delta P+M_0,C_{\text{g}}-T_{\text{g}} $	$ -\times \times \times $	ESS（条件5） ESS (condition 5)	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{14}(1,1,0,0) $	$ R_{\text{w}}-\Delta _2,\Delta _3,-\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}+T_{\text{g}} $	$ \times +-\times $	不稳定 Unstable	不太理想 Not quite ideal
$ E_{15}(1,1,1,0) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-\Delta _2,\Delta _3,\Delta P,-C_{\text{g}}-M_0+T_{\text{g}} $	$ -++\times $	不稳定 Unstable	理想 Ideal
$ E_{16}(1,1,1,1) $	$ -C_{\text{m}}-F_1-\Delta _2,-C_{\text{n}}+\Delta _3,\Delta P-M_0,C_{\text{g}}+M_0-T_{\text{g}} $	$ -\times \times \times $	ESS（条件6） ESS (condition 6)	理想 Ideal

表3

图1

图2

图3

图4

图5

图6

图7

图8

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