Scientia Silvae Sinicae ›› 2020, Vol. 56 ›› Issue (6): 152-164.doi: 10.11707/j.1001-7488.20200615
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Bowei Li1,Zhen Zhu2,*,Yueqin Shen1
Received:
2019-05-15
Online:
2020-06-25
Published:
2020-07-17
Contact:
Zhen Zhu
CLC Number:
Bowei Li,Zhen Zhu,Yueqin Shen. Impact of Industrial Organization Model on Ecological Management of Economic Forest Growers[J]. Scientia Silvae Sinicae, 2020, 56(6): 152-164.
Table 1
Regional distribution of tree species samples"
树种分布 Tree species distribution | 毛竹 Phyllostachys edulis | 榧树 Torreya grandis | 山核桃 Carya cathayensis | 油茶 Camellia oleifera | 板栗 Castanea mollissima | 雷竹 Phyllostachys praecox ‘Prevernalis’ | 合计 Total |
样本县 Sample counties | 安吉、龙游、 遂昌Anji, Longyou, Suichang | 诸暨、嵊州、 松阳Zhuji, Shengzhou, Songyang | 临安、淳安、 建德Lin’an, Chun’an, Jiande | 常山、青田 Changshan, Qingtian | 桐庐、云和 Tonglu, Yunhe | 临安 Lin’an | 13 |
样本数Sample size | 120 | 120 | 88 | 40 | 40 | 21 | 429 |
Table 2
Descriptive statistical results of variables"
变量 Variable | 代码 Code | 定义 Definition | 均值 Mean | 标准差 SD | 最大值 Max. | 最小值 Min. |
套种Interplanting | IP | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.40 | 0.49 | 1 | 0 |
人工除草Artificial weeding | AW | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.48 | 0.50 | 1 | 0 |
测土配方施肥Soil testing and formula fertilization | ST | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.21 | 0.41 | 1 | 0 |
降低施药强度 Reducing the intensity of pesticide application | RP | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.35 | 0.48 | 1 | 0 |
青果处理Green fruit treatment | GT | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.47 | 0.50 | 1 | 0 |
外种皮处理Exocarp treatment | ET | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.57 | 0.50 | 1 | 0 |
生态化经营得分Ecological management score | ES | 技术采纳综合得分Comprehensive score of technology adoption | 2.48 | 1.33 | 6 | 0 |
销售合同Market contract | MC | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.38 | 0.49 | 1 | 0 |
合作社Farmer cooperative | FC | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.23 | 0.42 | 1 | 0 |
公司+农户Company-farmer cooperative | CO | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.16 | 0.37 | 1 | 0 |
户主年龄Householder age | AG | — | 56.39 | 9.60 | 84 | 24 |
性别Gender | GE | 0=女;1=男 0=Female, 1=Male | 0.89 | 0.31 | 1 | 0 |
受教育年限Education years | ED | 自小学开始的受教育年限 Education years since primary school | 7.21 | 3.31 | 16 | 0 |
技术培训Technical training | TE | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.48 | 0.50 | 1 | 0 |
村干部Village cadres | VC | 0=否;1=是0=No, 1=Yes | 0.34 | 0.48 | 1 | 0 |
家庭收入Family income/104yuan | FI | 2017年家庭收入Family income 2017 | 10.51 | 11.17 | 100 | 0.15 |
家庭林业劳动力Family forestry labor | FL | 家庭从事林业劳动力人数Number of family workers engaged in forestry | 1.73 | 0.69 | 5 | 1 |
种植面积Planting area/hm2 | PA | — | 1.91 | 3.15 | 42.67 | 0.07 |
非农收入比重Proportion of non-agricultural income | NA | 非农收入与家庭总收入之比 Ratio of non-agricultural income to total household income | 0.63 | 0.36 | 1 | 0 |
样本数Number of samples | N | — | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 |
Table 3
Ecological management behavior of farmers under different organizational models"
生态化经营行为 Ecological management behavior | 独立经营的农户 Independent farmer | 与经销商签订销售 合同的农户 Farmer signing sales contract with distributor | 加入合作 社的农户 Farmer joining cooperatives | 与公司合 作的农户 Farmer cooperating with company | 总体 Total |
套种Interplanting(%) | 29.59 | 44.17 | 41 | 41.18 | 39.63 |
人工除草Artificial weeding(%) | 37.76 | 39.88 | 61 | 60.29 | 47.55 |
测土配方施肥 Soil testing and formula fertilization(%) | 7.14 | 11.66 | 41 | 36.76 | 21.45 |
降低施药强度 Reducing the intensity of pesticide application(%) | 36.73 | 26.38 | 44 | 39.71 | 34.97 |
青果处理Green fruit treatment(%) | 30.61 | 55.83 | 58 | 35.29 | 47.32 |
外种皮处理Exocarp treatment(%) | 33.67 | 78.53 | 60 | 35.29 | 57.11 |
综合得分均值 Ecological management score(mean) | 1.76 | 2.56 | 3.05 | 2.49 | 2.48 |
样本数Number of samples | 98 | 163 | 100 | 68 | 429 |
Table 4
The average marginal effect of industrial organization embeddedness on the comprehensive score of ecological management(ES)"
变量代码 Variable code | ES=0 | ES=1 | ES=2 | ES=3 | ES=4 | ES=5 | ES=6 |
MC | -0.019 5 | -0.040 8 | -0.014 1 | 0.018 0 | 0.032 7 | 0.017 4 | 0.006 3 |
(0.016 2) | (0.033 3) | (0.011 8) | (0.014 8) | (0.026 9) | (0.014 6) | (0.005 5) | |
FC | -0.037 2** | -0.078 1*** | -0.027 0** | 0.034 5** | 0.062 5*** | 0.033 2** | 0.012 1** |
(0.015 4) | (0.029 2) | (0.011 0) | (0.013 5) | (0.024 1) | (0.013 8) | (0.006 2) | |
CO | -0.028 7** | -0.060 3** | -0.020 8** | 0.026 6** | 0.048 2** | 0.025 6** | 0.009 3* |
(0.013 6) | (0.027 2) | (0.009 9) | (0.012 4) | (0.021 9) | (0.012 4) | (0.005 5) | |
AG | 0.001 0 | 0.002 1 | 0.000 7 | -0.000 9 | -0.001 6 | -0.000 9 | -0.000 3 |
(0.000 6) | (0.001 3) | (0.000 5) | (0.000 6) | (0.001 0) | (0.000 6) | (0.000 2) | |
GE | -0.058 6*** | -0.123 1*** | -0.042 5*** | 0.054 3*** | 0.098 5*** | 0.052 3*** | 0.019 1** |
(0.019 2) | (0.035 5) | (0.014 6) | (0.016 7) | (0.029 6) | (0.017 9) | (0.008 8) | |
ED | -0.003 5* | -0.007 3** | -0.002 5* | 0.003 2* | 0.005 9* | 0.003 1* | 0.001 1 |
(0.001 9) | (0.003 7) | (0.001 4) | (0.001 7) | (0.003 0) | (0.001 7) | (0.000 7) | |
TE | -0.013 0*** | -0.027 2*** | -0.009 4*** | 0.012 0*** | 0.021 8*** | 0.011 6*** | 0.042 1*** |
(0.003 1) | (0.010 4) | (0.002 9) | (0.004 0) | (0.008 0) | (0.003 8) | (0.012 8) | |
VC | -0.005 0 | -0.010 4 | -0.003 6 | 0.004 6 | 0.008 3 | 0.004 4 | 0.001 6 |
(0.011 2) | (0.023 5) | (0.008 2) | (0.010 4) | (0.018 9) | (0.010 0) | (0.003 7) | |
FI | 0.000 4 | 0.000 9 | 0.000 3 | -0.000 4 | -0.000 7 | -0.000 4 | -0.000 1 |
(0.000 5) | (0.001 0) | (0.000 4) | (0.000 5) | (0.000 8) | (0.000 4) | (0.000 2) | |
FL | 0.007 0 | 0.014 7 | 0.005 1 | -0.006 5 | -0.011 7 | -0.006 2 | -0.002 3 |
(0.007 5) | (0.015 5) | (0.005 4) | (0.006 9) | (0.012 4) | (0.006 7) | (0.002 5) | |
PA | -0.000 7 | -0.001 5 | -0.000 5 | 0.000 7 | 0.001 2 | 0.000 6 | 0.000 2 |
(0.001 7) | (0.003 5) | (0.001 2) | (0.001 5) | (0.002 8) | (0.001 5) | (0.000 5) | |
NA | 0.054 7** | 0.114 9** | 0.039 7** | -0.050 7** | -0.092 0** | -0.048 8** | -0.017 8 |
(0.024 7) | (0.050 7) | (0.018 6) | (0.023 6) | (0.044 6) | (0.023 1) | (0.048 0) | |
树种 Tree species | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled |
Log likelihood | -704.577 7 | ||||||
LR Chi2 | 34.40 | ||||||
Prob>Chi2 | 0.000 6 | ||||||
N | 429 |
Table 5
The average marginal effect of industrial organization embeddedness on farmers'adoption of single eco-technology"
变量代码 Variable code | IP | AW | ST | RP | GT | ET |
MC | 0.123 8* | 0.026 1 | 0.019 1 | 0.028 5 | 0.011 7 | 0.136 4** |
(0.072 6) | (0.058 5) | (0.051 6) | (0.055 6) | (0.056 2) | (0.056 1) | |
FC | 0.169 9** | 0.177 1*** | 0.298 5*** | 0.106 5* | 0.181 2*** | 0.196 5*** |
(0.062 8) | (0.060 7) | (0.045 1) | (0.056 6) | (0.060 5) | (0.052 4) | |
CO | 0.147 4*** | 0.173 9** | 0.246 7*** | 0.052 1 | 0.170 1** | 0.164 7** |
(0.059 0) | (0.069 8) | (0.052 3) | (0.065 2) | (0.069 1) | (0.064 0) | |
AG | -0.002 8 | 0.004 0 | 0.001 0 | -0.006 3** | -0.001 5 | -0.002 4 |
(0.002 8) | (0.002 8) | (0.002 2) | (0.002 6) | (0.002 7) | (0.002 6) | |
GE | 0.146 5* | 0.105 7 | 0.007 8 | 0.230 0*** | 0.118 4 | 0.112 2 |
(0.078 6) | (0.075 3) | (0.061 8) | (0.081 3) | (0.076 4) | (0.070 6) | |
ED | 0.014 1* | 0.001 1 | 0.000 1 | 0.007 3 | 0.011 5 | 0.019 6*** |
(0.008 2) | (0.008 0) | (0.006 4) | (0.007 4) | (0.007 9) | (0.007 4) | |
TE | 0.087 8* | 0.012 6 | 0.149 7*** | 0.129 3*** | 0.094 1** | 0.012 5 |
(0.048 2) | (0.048 5) | (0.037 6) | (0.044 4) | (0.046 8) | (0.045 6) | |
VC | -0.030 0 | 0.007 0 | 0.043 1 | 0.013 4* | 0.135 0*** | -0.005 2 |
(0.051 2) | (0.051 7) | (0.038 9) | (0.007 1) | (0.049 5) | (0.048 3) | |
FI | 0.000 2 | -0.005 2** | 0.003 7** | -0.002 5 | -0.003 7* | -0.006 2*** |
(0.002 2) | (0.002 2) | (0.001 7) | (0.002 0) | (0.002 2) | (0.002 4) | |
FL | -0.037 0 | 0.032 6 | -0.024 7 | -0.042 0 | -0.053 6 | -0.022 1 |
(0.034 1) | (0.033 4) | (0.026 6) | (0.031 7) | (0.033 0) | (0.031 6) | |
PA | 0.003 2 | -0.000 5 | 0.005 0 | 0.060 9 | -0.008 7 | -0.006 4 |
(0.007 6) | (0.008 6) | (0.004 9) | (0.048 5) | (0.007 0) | (0.007 6) | |
NA | -0.073 7 | -0.321 8*** | -0.008 5 | -0.231 3*** | -0.305 5*** | -0.231 4*** |
(0.068 0) | (0.062 4) | (0.053 2) | (0.061 1) | (0.060 7) | (0.059 5) | |
树种 Tree species | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled | 已控制 Controlled |
Log likelihood | -274.521 0 | -270.399 1 | -181.643 2 | -246.153 1 | -264.664 4 | -244.197 6 |
LR Chi2 | 27.08 | 52.89 | 82.70 | 63.02 | 64.16 | 97.62 |
Prob>Chi2 | 0.007 5 | 0.000 0 | 0.000 0 | 0.000 0 | 0.000 0 | 0.000 0 |
N | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 |
Table 6
Propensity Score Matching(PSM) estimation of the impact of industrial organization embeddedness on ecological management"
变量代码 Variable code | 效应 Effect | ES | IP | AW | ST | RP | GT | ET |
MC | ATT | 0.085 9 | 0.092 0 | 0.088 2 | 0.059 4 | 0.085 9 | 0.085 9 | 0.118 8* |
ATU | 0.210 6 | 0.007 5 | 0.017 4 | 0.125 2 | -0.007 5 | 0.079 0 | 0.039 9 | |
ATE | 0.163 2 | 0.039 6 | 0.044 3 | 0.100 2 | 0.028 0 | 0.081 6 | 0.069 9 | |
FC | ATT | 0.557 4*** | 0.149 5** | 0.199 0*** | 0.336 6*** | 0.171 8*** | 0.263 8*** | 0.220 6*** |
ATU | 0.550 9 | 0.194 6 | 0.231 3 | 0.320 2 | 0.175 7 | 0.099 1 | 0.322 0 | |
ATE | 0.552 4*** | 0.184 1*** | 0.223 8*** | 0.324 0*** | 0.174 8** | 0.137 5** | 0.298 4*** | |
CO | ATT | 0.388 2** | 0.129 4* | 0.098 2* | 0.176 5** | 0.058 8 | 0.161 8** | 0.168 3*** |
ATU | 0.465 6 | 0.162 2 | 0.158 8 | 0.066 5 | 0.080 3 | 0.119 1 | 0.250 9 | |
ATE | 0.453 3** | 0.157 0* | 0.149 2** | 0.083 9 | 0.076 9 | 0.125 9** | 0.237 8*** | |
N | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 | 429 |
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